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Abstract. The new digital economy has renewed interest in how digital agents
can innovate. This follows the legacy of John von Neumann dynamical systems
theory on complex biological systems as computation. The Go¨del-Turing-Post
(GTP) logic is shown to be necessary to generate innovation based structure
changing Type 4 dynamics of the Wolfram-Chomsky schema. Two syntactic
procedures of GTP logic permit digital agents to exit from listable sets of dig-
ital technologies to produce novelty and surprises. The first is meta-analyses
or oﬄine simulations. The second is a fixed point with a two place encoding of
negation or opposition, referred to as the Go¨del sentence. It is postulated that
in phenomena ranging from the genome to human proteanism, the Go¨del sen-
tence is a ubiquitous syntactic construction without which escape from hostile
agents qua the Liar is impossible and digital agents become entrained within
fixed repertoires. The only recursive best response function of a 2-person ad-
versarial game that can implement strategic innovation in lock-step formation
of an arms race is the productive function of the Emil Post [58] set theoretic
proof of the Go¨del incompleteness result. This overturns the view of game
theorists that surprise and innovation cannot be a Nash equilibrium of a game.
1. Introduction. Operations on discrete chunks of encoded information are the
hallmark of digital and computational phenomena, which are known for their capac-
ity to produce error free copies. Recently, economists Brynjolfsson and McAfee [14]
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described the implications of the widespread use of digitization in processes and
products of the so called Second Machine Age1. In addition to important insights
in their work on how digital technologies with their network effects and winner
take all prizes will lead to some “weird and wonderful economics”, Brynjolfsson
and McAfee [14] assert that in the digital age, the easy access to a growing library
of encoded processes and products gives rise to ‘recombinant innovations’. There
is now a widely held view that operations on digital information, also referred to
as recursive or computable functions2, contribute to the key building blocks for
innovation in wide ranging areas. These include evolution and operations of the
genome (Holland [36], Ben-Jacob [11], Mirowski [49], Pellionisz [57], Lieberman-
Aiden [40]); protean behaviours associated with the growth of the neocortex, com-
plex neural dynamics in cognition (Markose [44], Corballis [20], Tsuda [70]); human
language (Chomsky [19, 18], Hauser et. al [32]); and, human technological progress
(Arthur [6], Beinhocker [10], Youn et. al [74]).
The focus of the paper is on How Can Digital Agents Innovate? Digital agents op-
erate on encoded information and represent a wide array of phenomena covering the
artificial and biological. Following the early provenance of John von Neumann [73]
in the 1940s, models of dynamical systems associated with digital agents involve
recursive function theory rather than differential equations. Von Neumann drew
on his work on self-reproducing automata as models for complex biological systems
to engineer a radical transformation of dynamical systems theory from one that is
based on motion, force and energy to the capabilities and constraints of information
processing agents modelled as computing machines which operate on information
in an encoded form3. Hence, the paper will give an overview of some of the key
mathematical and scientific developments on the role of digital agents and recur-
sive function theory, especially in the context of novelty production, in genomic
evolution, cognition, economic systems and game theory. The paper contributes to
the nexus on dynamics, games and science, by formalizing an important class of
dynamics associated with a strategic game between oppositional digital agents in
which innovations occur.
The significance of the von Neumann computational legacy of complex adaptive
systems (CAS) is that it covers all substrata, ranging from an intra-cellular bio-
chemical medium to an artificial one of silicon chips, in which effective procedures
or computation reside. It is the pioneering work in mathematical logic by Go¨del [28],
Turing [71], and Post [58] (GTP logic from here on) that laid the foundations of
what digital agents can and cannot do. By the Church-Turing thesis (Cutland [21]),
the intuitive notion of effective procedures or an algorithm is identified with the class
1Brynjolfsson and McAfee [14] discuss how the low cost replication with digital technology
with its rapid ubiquity and perfect fidelity result in “weird and wonderful economics” that include
Power Law outcomes for income distribution.
2See Soare [66] for an interesting discussion of the history behind the wider use of the term
recursive function theory for computability theory. As two popular textbooks by Rogers [61] and
Cutland [21], extensively referred to in my paper, respectively, use each of these terms as titles
of their books and proceed to discuss the same subject matter relating to agents that conduct
operations on encoded information, I will use the terms equivalently. Also reference to agents
being digital or computational will be made equivalently in so far as both classes of agents operate
on discrete alpha-numeric bases for encoding information.
3Mirowski [49] discusses how radical a shift this has been for the methodology of science and
also from the perspective of von Neumann’s earlier work with Oscar Morgenstern on the Theory
of Games and Economic Behaviour.
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of general recursive functions4 and represent finitely encodable programs executed
in a number of equivalent ways referred to as automata or mechanism.
Turing machines (TMs) (Turing [71]) are the best known ideal class of the most
powerful digital agents. Following the epochal work of Go¨del [28] which laid the
foundations of encoding all syntactic objects in terms of integers called Go¨del num-
bers (g.ns) or indexes, Turing machine operations along with their inputs and out-
puts can be given a meta-representation by using further codes in what is called a
formal system, Smullyan [65]. Post [58] developed the theory of sets of indexes of
TMs, both in terms of the domain and range of TM operations that can be listed by
TMs when they halt. These are called recursively enumerable sets. This led to an
ingenious formulation, from well-known logical antecedents of the Cantor diagonal
lemma and the embodiment of opposition given by the Liar5, (Go¨del [28]), of a fixed
point logic gate involving negation, typically referred to as the Go¨del sentence, that
marks the exit route from recursively enumerable sets of syntactic objects, in the
formal system. This is the celebrated Go¨del incompleteness result in that TMs pro-
duce syntactic objects, called undecidable propositions that no TM can enumerate.
Though often regarded as a limitative result on what computers can do, as Post [58]
shows with his aptly named creative and productive sets in the set theoretic proof of
the Go¨del incompleteness result, a recursive mapping from a Go¨del sentence entails
a productive function that provides an exit strategy from known recursively listable
sets of encoded technologies to produce new digital objects that can be arranged in
a structure of a never ending arms race (see, Smullyan [65], Cutland [21]).
Hence, on considering the von Neumann nexus on dynamical systems as out-
comes of computing agents, we have the so called Wolfram-Chomsky schema (see,
Wolfram [75], Chomsky [18]6, Casti [17], Langton [39], Albin [2], Markose [45, 44]).
The Wolfram-Chomsky schema shows that on varying the computational capabil-
ities of agents, different system wide dynamics can be generated: finite automata
produce Type 1 dynamics with unique limit points or homogeneity; push down
automata produce Type 2 dynamics with limit cycles; linear-bounded automata
generate Type 3 chaotic trajectories with strange attractors. The significance of
4General recursive functions include all elementary arithmetic, logical operations and also func-
tions obtained from substitution, iteration and recursion. In the latter, functions call on themselves
and use inputs that are outputs from previous calculations. See, Cutland [21] and Rogers [61],
which are well known text books on this.
5The Liar is the embodiment of a hostile agent which can negate, controvert or falsify a code
that it can successfully enumerate or predict. Since antiquity, it has been known that self-refuting
statements generate paradoxes as in the Cretan Liar proposition: this is false. Go¨del’s analogue of
the Liar proposition is the undecidable proposition. The latter, denoted as A in some appropriate
code, has the following structure : A ↔ ¬Prov(A). Prov(A) is a recursive function and A is
regarded to be the fixed point of ¬Prov(A) (see, Moschovakis [50], Gaifman [24]). A effectively
says of itself that it is not provable in the formal system. However, unlike the Cretan Liar
there is no paradox in Go¨del’s undecidable proposition as it can be proved that this is so, viz.
` A ↔ ¬Prov(A), where ` denotes the symbol for theoremhood in the formal system. Any
attempt to prove the proposition A results in a contradiction with both A and ¬A, its negation,
being provable in the system. Simmons [64, p.29] has noted how with the Cantor diagonal lemma
(which proves that the power set of a set has greater cardinality than a set) we begin to have so
called “good” uses of self-refuting structures that result in theorems rather than paradoxes.
6In Chomsky [18], the schema for the grammar of languages, which is called the Chomsky
hierarchy, reverses the sequence of numbering with Type 0 being the most complex. Type 0
represents languages such as English, the sentences of which require the generative powers of
Turing Machines. More restrictive automata identical to the ones listed in the Wolfram schema,
respectively, produce regular, context free and context sensitive grammars.
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this schema is that it postulates that only agents with the full powers of Turing ma-
chines capable of simulating other Turing machines can produce Type 4 irregular
innovation-based structure changing undecidable dynamics. The epithet of complex
adaptive system (CAS) is applied exclusively to Type 4 dynamics by Casti [17],
Langton [39] and Albin [2], who also refer to the novelty and surprises that are
manifest in Type 4 dynamics7.
In the spirit of von Neumann [73], Goldberg [29] claims that the mystery shroud-
ing innovation can be dispelled ... “by a heavy dose of mechanism. Many of the
difficulties (in this area) ....come from a lack of a computational theory of actor
innovation”. In Binmore [13], the eminent game theorist proposed the requisite
dose of mechanism and pointed to the fundamental strategic game theoretic aspect
behind innovation in digital agents. He was seminal in proposing the need to inject
Go¨del logic, specifically in the form of the adversarial or contrarian agent of the
Liar, who can negate what it can predict/compute, into the extant game theory
framework. This would then engender radical indeterminism in the form of Go¨del
incompleteness. However, to date game theory has remained resolutely closed and
complete in the logical sense with no scope for novelty and surprises in the form of
new digital objects. Indeed, as will be reviewed, it is alleged that a central solution
concept of game theory, viz. Nash equilibrium, cannot accommodate novelty or
surprises.
To rigorously define novel digital objects, depending on the scientific domain,
it is useful to consider these to include the set of all potential actions or be-
havioural phenotypes and technologies or artefacts, which are extended phenotypes,
Dawkins [22]8. These can be represented as indexes of TMs that always halt (also
known as total computable functions). Such a number set of all potential technolo-
gies denoted by R, is infinite and also not recursively enumerable, viz. there is
no systematic way of ‘searching’ or listing this set. Some finite subset of this set
entails g.ns of known technologies and can represent a given listable action set A
of traditional game theory. A novelty or a surprise is an encoded object in the set
(R − A), ie. outside of set A that contains known technologies. The question is
how can a formal system of the game involving digital agents, embedded in each of
the agents, produce a total computable strategy function, which is called a surprise
strategy, to exit the given action set A in the Nash equilibrium of the game?
Following Binmore [13], the objective of the paper is to use the GTP logic to
formalize a 2-person adversarial game involving the Liar to examine how the where-
withal of Go¨del meta-mathematics to encode the Go¨del sentence becomes the nec-
essary condition for digital agents to exit from known listable technologies or phe-
notypes and implement Type 4 dynamics. In the absence of this, digital agents
will be entrained within a fixed repertoire of actions. The paper will base the proof
of novelty production and an arms race in it on what many regard (Smullyan [65,
7With regard to this, Mirowski [49, p.141] has asserted that mathematicians finally have blazed
the trail to a formalised logical theory of evolution. Given extensive discussions on what constitutes
a novelty in evolution (see, for example Mu¨ller and Newman [51]), Type 4 novelty production
rules out all TM listable codes for phenotypes and singles out only those digital outputs that are
undecidable.
8Dawkins [22] uses the notion of extended phenotype to include the myriad artefacts made by
organisms that reside external to themselves. Examples of this range from ant hills, bees hives,
beaver dams, on the one hand, to gun powder, skyscrapers and iPhone devices.
TYPE 4 DYNAMICS AND INNOVATIONS BY DIGITAL AGENTS 259
p.58], Soare [66]9) to be the most elegant and intuitive approach to Go¨del incom-
pleteness using the Post [58] productive function. One of the main contributions of
the paper is to show that the Post productive function implements the Nash equi-
librium surprise strategy function of the adversarial game and therefore can provide
the arms race like arrangements observed in the exponents of CAS which manifest
Type 4 dynamics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will survey recent devel-
opments in science, which can help demarcate between a specific application of re-
cursion in many important morphological arrangements in organic and non-organic
forms in nature and the necessity for the full gamut of GTP logic underpinning
the Type 4 dynamics associated with three main exponents of CAS. These include
evolutionary biology and immunology; the brain and cognition; and strategic inter-
actions in socio-economic systems with capitalism, which has long been identified by
Schumpeter [63] as manifesting disruptive novelty production. Two features stand
out. The concept of protean behaviours, so called after the Greek God Proteus,
has been mainstreamed by Driver and Humphries [23], Byrne and Whiten [15] and
Miller [48], to give an evolutionary explanation for why living organisms resort to
surprise and change as a strategy to escape from hostile agents. Secondly, with
the Red Queen10 having become emblematic of competitive co-evolution, there is
growing evidence of the Red Queen type arms race in all these exponents of CAS.
Section 2, therefore, provides some key evidence for the postulate that phenomena
ranging from the quintessential digital agency of the genome, which Ben-Jacob [11]
presciently referred to as the ‘creative genome’ from which emanates a plethora
of junk DNA11 , to the recent discovery of the mirror neuron system in human
cognition and complex protean interactions, the innovations far from being the con-
sequence of being random mutation, can be formalized as a manifestation of the
GTP logic.
The GTP logic underpinning the 2-person game with TMs, which purports to
produce an arms race with innovations in phenotype or technology when opposi-
tional interests prevail, will be outlined and organized in the following sections.
(i) GTP logic requires that agents operate on encoded information; they can encode
all operations and store codes. Section 3 starts with the GTP preliminaries on
encoding in terms of integers famously called g.ns/indexes and the Post [58] set
theory for Go¨del incompleteness results based on the enumeration of indexes of
9Soare [66] states: “Post’s papers brought excitement, intuitive appeal, and an informal style
of proof, much closer to ordinary mathematical proofs, and represented the real birth of the
subject of recursively enumerable sets”. Smullyan [65, p.58] has noted that the pair of recursively
enumerable disjoint sets entailed in the creative and productive sets, play a fundamental role in
modern approaches to incompleteness and undecidability
10The Red Queen is the character in Lewis Carol’s Alice Through the Looking Glass, who
signifies the need ‘to run faster and faster to stay in the square’. The Red Queen hypothesis first
proposed by van Valen [72] has become emblematic of the outcome of competitive co-evolution for
evolutionary biologists in that no competitor gains absolute ground, see Markose [44].
11See, the July 2016 feature in the New Scientist on the puzzle regarding the relative small
size of the number of genes in the human genome relative to the more numerous accretions of
junk DNA which account for the characteristics that make us human. This was first discussed
in Ohno [55]. This paper gives precedence to the work of Ben-Jacob [11] in the context of GTP
logic and the genome. However, it must be noted that the biologist Barbara McClintock [47] in
her Nobel Prize lecture of 1984 made a bold conjecture that has led to the notion of a ‘dynamic
genome’, which can initiate mutations in response to specific stresses being experienced, thereby
suggesting that genomic mutations need not all be random.
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TMs. For our purposes to show that the Nash equilibrium surprise strategy is a
non-trivial Post productive function, Lemma 3.8 in Section 3 is instrumental in
showing how incompleteness can be formalized in a general setting using recursive
reduction to the archetypical creative and productive sets.
(ii) The second ingredient of GTP logic is the capacity of digital agents to do Go¨del
meta-mathematics. In Section 4, this is shown to be crucial for TM agents to play
an interactive game. Firstly, agents have the capacity to do oﬄine simulations
corresponding to a 1-1 recursive mapping with online machine execution, which
precipitates an action or phenotype in the agent. This Go¨del meta-mathematics,
well known from Rogers [61], which also involves the two place Go¨del substitution
function, will be shown to have a close bearing on the recent discovery of the mirror
neuron system (MNS) on how self and the other can be integrated in a meta-
system. The so called MNS hypothesis postulates that understanding others involve
self-referential meta-calculations arising from encoded neural imprints emanating
from agent’s own execution of procedures via the canonical neurons. Section 4
provides an original graphical illustration of the so called MNS hypothesis for action
prediction in the other and the two place Go¨del substitution function of Go¨del meta-
mathematics, Rogers [61]. The stock in trade of recursive function theory to do with
diagonal arrangements and the Second Recursion Theorem is shown to characterize
Nash equilibria in a two place diagonal array of the fixed point mappings of recursive
strategy functions.
(iii) The third ingredient of the GTP logic is that agents record negation and can
process the logical archetype of the Liar in a fixed point setting. In Section 5, The-
orem 5.2 will prove that the only exit route from relevant recursively enumerable
strategy sets requires the negation operation of the Liar or contrarian strategy func-
tion, which will be denoted by f¬. This Liar or contrarian strategy function, f¬
operates on a specific code of the opponent, which is amenable to action prediction,
and will negate or subvert it. The first significant point is that the Liar can win only
out of equilibrium when the identity of the Liar is not recorded by the other. The
second and more famous result is that when there is mutual or common encoding of
the Liar, we are at Go¨del’s non-computable fixed point encapsulated in the Go¨del
sentence.
Thereafter, as shown in Theorem 6.2 in Section 6, any non-trivial recursive
strategy function based on the Go¨del sentence is the so called Post productive
function (Post [58]) of Lemma 3.8 of Section 3 that determines the logical necessity
for surprise mappings into the set (R−A). As the productive function in logic maps
outside recursively enumerable strategy sets to implement novelty and surprise, it
will be denoted as f !, and it will be shown to be the Nash equilibrium surprise
strategy function.
2. Recursion and GTP logic in novelty production: A survey. This section
will provide a brief overview of the use of recursive function theory in nature and
evolutionary frameworks and also in cognition and game theory.
2.1. Recursion in nature and evolution. Many accounts of the power of recur-
sion refer to the role of recombinations or concatenations of previously encoded algo-
rithms which in turn can be reused as inputs for further outputs. Many economists
(Arthur [6], Youn et. al [74], Beinhocker [10], Brynjolfsson and McAfee [14]) give
similar descriptions for the scope and speed of innovations in the digital revolution
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unfolding in advanced economies. In the case where recursive functions are able
to call on themselves to produce self-similarity at multiple (iterated) hierarchical
scales, we have the famous discoveries that include how these encoded algorithms
produce the fractal geometry of DNA packaging12 (see, Lieberman-Aiden et. al. [40],
Pellionisz [57]), as well as the morphology of many biological organisms and organs.
Chomsky [19, 18] had adduced similar generative powers of TMs as a condition for
human language usage to produce embedded and hierarchical sentence construction,
but, in addition, he has postulated an unbounded creativity of the human language,
which is part of the recursive framework, but can surpass what can be recursively
enumerated. Indeed, Chomsky and co-authors (Hauser et al. [32]) famously pro-
posed grammatical recursion as being unique to human language. Corballis [20] has
argued that the incorporation of recursion into other cognitive domains predates its
incorporation into language. In the case of genetic algorithms, Holland [36] high-
lighted the role for random recombination and concatenation of ‘genetic’ codes from
parents as a source of diversity in progeny which are then selected for their fitness.
It is argued that while the machine execution of a simple recursive fractal code
produces what are recognized to be phenomenal hierarchical self-similar patterns
and clearly illustrate the power of recursion, both this and the Holland [36] model
of random recombinations of syntactic objects in his genetic algorithms fall short
of the important aspect of the GTP model for innovations as new syntactic objects
that are forced outside extant recursively enumerable sets, which arise from the
response of digital agents to an encoding of negation or opposition.
Two important features have been observed in the Type 4 dynamics of well
known examples of CAS. The first is the strategic aspect of protean behaviours aris-
ing from adversarial situations and the second is the Red Queen type co-evolutionary
dynamics that accompanies the innovation process.
As seen in Kashiwagi and Yomo [37] and in a related growing literature (see,
Samson et. al. [62]), experimental molecular studies on organisms such as E-coli,
RNA virus and bacteriophages are designed so that the changes in phenotypes and
genotypes of coevolving parasite-host pairs can be monitored through the arms
race. Kashiwagi and Yomo [37] find that the virus and its host can coexist in an
evolutionary arms race, despite a difference in genome mutability (i.e., mutations
per replication) of approximately one to three orders of magnitude. The evidence
that mutual genomic and phenotype changes are triggered in a synchronized manner
in an arms race between adversarial microbes that permit coexistence, directly
controverts random mutation as the sole driver of evolution of new forms, Ben-
Jacob [11] and McClintock [47].
Baumol [8, 9], who has extensively documented and discussed the role of the
relentless Red Queen type strategic arms race in innovation by firms of products and
processes in capitalism, claims that this is not addressed in mainstream economics13.
12On the cover page of Science for the article by Lieberman-Aiden et. al. [40], Mr. Lander,
one of the co-authors and also Science Adviser to the US President, says: “Mr. President, the
Genome is Fractal !” The important feature of the power of a recursive function, viz. an algorithm
like the one that produces fractal morphology in biological systems, is that it only requires a few
lines of code and a bio-chemical equivalent of a linear bounded automata to execute it. The same
fractal geometry can be seen if the code for this algorithm is run on a personal computer. Note,
fractals belong to the class of chaotic dynamics, Mandelbrot [42].
13In the wake of the 2007 Great Financial Crisis, renewed efforts are being made to come to
terms with arms races in novelty production, especially in the monetary and financial system (see,
Haldane [31]).
262 SHERI M. MARKOSE
Recently, in the wake of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis, there has been criticism
that economists gave insufficient attention to a regulator-regulatee arms race. This
is arguably no different from a parasite host dynamics in immunology, as in for
example, Kashiwagi and Yomo [37], which requires monitoring and production of
countervailing new measures by authorities (comparable to the production of anti-
bodies) if system failure is to be avoided and competitive coexistence of diversity
is to be preserved, Axelrod [7]. Thus, though fully formalizable in the Go¨del logic,
insufficient attention has been paid to role of the adversarial structure of negation
inherent in a fixed point formulation of the Go¨del sentence as the logical driver
of incompleteness in systems involving digital agents. Likewise, there has been
little discussion on the arms race structure of the Post [58] productive sets and its
correspondence with many empirical observations on the arms races in phenotypes
and extended phenotypes (Dawkins [22]) of interacting organisms.
What evidence is there in manifestations of CAS that involve human and micro-
bial agents that they have the wherewithal to produce syntactic objects equivalent
to the Go¨del sentence, which are the only known logical exit points from a fixed
repertoire of actions for digital agents?
At the level of cell biology with regard to threats by microbial agents to a code
relating to the genome of a host, Eshel Ben-Jacob [11]14 is one of the first to explic-
itly discuss the relevance of Go¨del logic both in the detection of threats and also to
adduce creative genomic changes that alter phenotype that can counter threats15.
It is highly significant that Ben-Jacob [11] used the Go¨del framework to throw
light on the growing evidence that mutual genomic changes arising from adversarial
interaction at the level of microbes can drive evolution, over and above random
mutations. Ben-Jacob presciently discussed the following capabilities that ‘genome
units’ should possess (Ibid. p.59) to be able to engineer, possibly as emergent out-
comes, novel artifacts and behaviours: (i) Capacity to recognize the difficulties in
environment or hostile conditions that are a threat to a code relating to some func-
tionality; (ii) Need for advanced language that includes self-referential mapping;
Finally and significantly, (iii) Even with earliest microbial forms of life, there is
evidence of evolved social capabilities of recognizing signals between self and the
other which requires a rich (chemical) language.
As will be shown, these correspond to the main ingredients of Go¨del meta-
analyses from which incompleteness follows. The recent remarkable molecular ex-
periments on changes in phenotypes and genotypes of coevolving parasite-host pairs
(see, Kashiwagi and Yomo [37] and Samson et. al. [62]) have recorded both the orig-
inal codes in the respective genomes of the host and parasite and the novel codes
that evolved in the course of the arms race. With the genome being a quintessential
digital agent, it can be conjectured that from the very get-go of the genome itself,
it has the recursive powers to generate syntactic objects called the Go¨del sentence
which identifies in a self-referential way that a code is under attack in order to exit
from fixed predictable phenotypes.
2.2. Go¨del meta-mathematics and the mirror neuron system. Just as there
is some evidence for the relevance of Go¨del logic for the genome, explicitly presented
14In conversation with the author, Ben-Jacob underscored that getting smart in evolutionary
terms is war by other means.
15Despite his seminal insights, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss certain anti-
machine views of Ben-Jacob [11] which make claims for semantic knowledge that go beyond the
sub-personal syntactic expression of the Go¨del sentence.
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as such by Ben-Jacob [11] for the necessity of explaining protean genomic arms
races, the recent discovery of the mirror neuron system (MNS) by the Parma group
(Gallese et. al. [26], Rizzolatti et. al. [60]), can be regarded as one of the most
important scientific discoveries of the late 20th century to understand complex
social behaviours and in particular the u¨ber proteanism of humans16.
Gallese [25], Gallese and Sinigaglia [27] have characterized the MNS as a common
neuronal platform for conducting oﬄine embodied simulations for action prediction
in the other based on a parallel set of neurons that fire during action execution by
one-self17,18. The neurons that fire with actual action execution are called canonical
neurons (Arbib and Fagg [5]). This discovery has revolutionized our understanding
of social coordination. While Gallese and others make a descriptive analogy between
MNS and oﬄine simulation, they do not refer to the two place Go¨del substitution
function in Go¨del meta-mathematics (Rogers [61]) which can provide the mathe-
matical model of what is meant by oﬄine simulation and also how it can implement
action prediction regarding self and the other using recursive self-referential map-
ping19. Indeed, as noted, Go¨del meta-mathematics is about the 1-1 syntactic oﬄine
recording of machine execution, with the latter in the MNS corresponding to the
firing of canonical neurons during action execution.
In addition, in order for the mirror neuron system to fulfil the full scope of the
GTP logic, the MNS must include operations that entail negation that underpins
the Liar or opposition. Again, in a remarkable set of experiments by Scott Kelso
and his group (see, Tognoli et. al. [69], Naeem et. al. [53]), the recording of neuro-
physiological markers of anti-coordination that arises from actions that need to be
different/opposite from what is predicted of another, indicate that these are also
part of the human mirror neuron system. This is an important piece of evidence
for Go¨del logic to be relevant as an analogue of cognitive incompleteness associated
with the capacity to ‘think outside the box’ and produce protean behaviours20.
16Byrne and Whiten [15] have presented extensive evidence on the development of the Machi-
avellian brain. Ramachandran [59] has famously underscored the importance of the discovery of
the mirror neuron system as being crucial for explanations of complex social interactions especially
in the context of man as the Machiavellian primate. The latter is conjectured to require mind
reading and action prediction in others.
17The neurons that fire with actual action execution are called canonical neurons (Arbib and
Fagg [5]) which will be shown to correspond to on-line machine executions in the GTP logic.
18Ramachandran [59] describes this as follows: “It’s as if anytime you want to make a judge-
ment about someone else’s movements you have to run a VR (virtual reality) simulation of the
corresponding movements in your own brain and without mirror neurons you cannot do this.”
19Tsuda [70] identifies how neural systems which need to process a self-referential description
use the mirror neuron system as in the mathematics of the Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem :
“When neural systems process a self-referential description, they may first have to make a copy
of the object of self-reference and then refer to this copy. This two-stage formulation can be
realized mathematically in the proof of the Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem through the processes
of projecting mathematical statements to natural numbers and of referring to meta-mathematical
statements by providing mathematical statements about such numbers. The presence of mirror
neurons in animal brains or mirror neuron systems in human brains may also be a realization of
the above two-stage formulation in brains, because mirror neurons, or mirror-neuron systems, can
be activated, not only by behavior in others similar to one’s own behavior, but also by one’s own
behavior. This can be represented in a dynamical systems model.” Despite this important insight
on the mirror neuron system and Go¨del logic in Tsuda [70], Tsuda does not refer to the MNS as
the model of oﬄine simulation given in Go¨del meta-analysis, Rogers [61].
20F.A. Hayek is the first economist who discussed the implications for economics that arise
from the problems of non-computability that he called the limits of constructive reason and on the
possibility that the brain manifests Go¨del incompleteness (Hayek [33, 35]). Due to the fortuitous
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Only those well versed in GTP logic will see the logical necessity for negation to be
part of the MNS for it to be the source of proteanism.
2.3. Recursive function theory and game theory. The final building block
that is needed to fulfil the objective of this paper is the development of a two
person oppositional game involving Turing machines in which Type 4 dynamics
of an arms race in technology or phenotype follows. As noted in Markose [45, 44],
it is the game theorist Binmore [13], who first seminally raised the “spectre of
Go¨del” (ibid) in the context of a game between Turing machines. The question
that Binmore asks is whether the scope of strategic behaviour can be restricted to
a system that is logically closed and complete. In game theory, there are strategy
mappings to a fixed action set and indeterminism extends only to randomizations
between given actions. Binmore states that in outlawing strategic indeterminism
or novelty production, the question that is pertinent here is the center piece of
Go¨del [28]: ‘what of the Liar?’ By this is meant that when faced by a hostile
agent who will falsify or negate one’s actions if he could deduce what they are,
can one rationally play such an action which can be formally deduced/predicted by
the adversarial TM? Or does one innovate and ‘surprise’ the opposition? However,
here we are confronted by the omission noted by Binmore [13] that relates to the
assumption of the completeness paradigm in which extant game theory is couched21.
As reiterated by many game theorists, it is held that it is not possible to produce
novelty or surprises in a Nash equilibrium, let alone the structure of an arms race in
strategic innovation. Bhatt and Camerer [12] succinctly state this: “in a Nash equi-
librium nobody is surprised about what others actually do, or what others believe,
because strategies and beliefs are synchronized, presumably due to introspection,
communication or learning.” What is missing in this statement is the category of
mutual expectation of surprise and the characterization of a Nash equilibrium in
which players logically expect that they will need to surprise and be surprised. As
will be shown, there is nothing inherent to a Nash equilibrium in which the strategic
necessity of a surprise cannot be formulated. Indeed, novelty and surprise become
a logical necessity to avoid inconsistency.
The game theory papers such as Albin [1, 2], Anderlini [3], Anderlini and Sa-
bourian [4], Canning [16], Nachbar and Zame [52], which use recursive function
theory, tend to focus exclusively on defining the problem of indeterminacy associated
with self-refuting decision structures. These game theory papers do not discuss the
possibility for surprise strategies and innovations that are arranged in a structure of
an arms race. The problems here are twofold. These papers do not utilize the major
methodological triumph of Go¨del [28] which is the meta-analysis that produces fully
Viennese connection between Hayek and Go¨del, Hayek seminally redirected the discussion on
the limits of deductive inference from Humean scepticism to the Go¨del logic of incompleteness
(Markose [46, 44]) and indeed brought this to my attention by instructing me to read his book
on the Sensory Order (Hayek [33]). However, Hayek’s own account of this did not go beyond
the Cantor diagonal lemma (see footnote 5), which led him to a view on cognitive incompleteness
in terms of much knowledge that cannot be formally enumerated. As with the many so called
computational models of cognition, which do not go beyond descriptive analogy, Hayek’s theory of
cognitive incompleteness though seminal in linking it with the Go¨del incompleteness result, falls
far short of the full paraphernalia of GTP logic. Also, as Hayek’s work predates the discovery of
the mirror neuron system, there was scant evidence that the neurophysiology of the brain had any
powers for oﬄine simulation associated with Go¨del meta-mathematics.
21In many respects, this can be seen as being analogous to the pre McClintock [47] era in gene
research.
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definable meta propositions, in an ever extendable sequence, in terms of the Post [58]
productive functions that provide recursive mappings from self-refuting fixed points,
viz. Go¨del sentences, to the outside of given recursively enumerable sets in order
to avoid logical inconsistency. Hence, the aphorism that sufficiently rich formal
systems cannot be both consistent and complete. Secondly, the characterization
of Nash equilibria as fixed points of recursive strategy functions seem not to be
specified as such. Though Spear [67] does not explicitly depict a game, Spear [67]
was the first economist to use the Second Recursion Theorem (Cutland [21]) to
model fixed points of recursive functions. Arguably, without the proper formalism
for characterizing fixed points of recursive functions, the Nash equilibria of a game
which requires the identification of the meta-representations of mutual best response
functions in a two place diagonal alignment, one could be forced into different
“resolutions” of classic oppositional problems22.
3. Post [58] productive function approach to Wolfram-Chomsky type 4
dynamics. Here we start to formalize a 2-person game for TM agents that operate
on encoded information and also the Post [58] formalism for a model of novelty
production.
3.1. Mathematical preliminaries. The method for encoding introduced by Go¨-
del [28] called Go¨del numbering, implies that encoded information is represented
in terms of integers. All objects constructed from a countable alphabet can be
put into 1 − 1 mapping with the set of natural numbers referred to as their Go¨del
numbers (g.ns, for short). As computers involve operations on codes, they are
number theoretic functions, f : N → N , where N is the set of all integers23.
Each computable function24 is identified by the index or g.n of the program
that computes it when operating on an input and producing an output if the func-
tion is defined or the calculation terminates at this point. Following a well known
notational convention adopted in Cutland [21], we state this for a single valued
computable function as follows:
f(x) ∼= φa(x) = q. (1)
That is, the value of a computable function f(x) when computed using the pro-
gram/TM with index a is equal to an integer φa(x) = q, if φa(x) is defined or halts
(denoted as φa(x) ↓) or the function f(x) is undefined (∼) when φa(x) does not
22Koppl and Rosser [38] attempt to characterize the Nash equilibrium of the zero sum game
that depicts the machinations of the well-known oppositional game involving Holmes and Moriarty
using recursive function theory. Moriarty who seeks the demise of Holmes has to be in proximity
with him while Holmes needs to elude Moriaty. Koppl and Rosser [38] conclude as follows: “We
can see that there are best-reply functions, f(x), such that f(x) 6= x for all x. That is, there are
best-reply functions without a fixed point. A fixed point is defined by the condition that f(x) = x.”
As outlined in footnote 5, it will be shown that Go¨del meta-mathematics has no problem in giving
a syntactic expression of the fixed point of the best response function that seeks to negate or
deceive as in the Holmes-Moriarty game. The important point here, therefore, is not that one or
the other player has to find a best response function that does not have a fixed point, but that the
fixed point of an important class of best response functions is a self-referencing computer code of
a recursive function that will not halt and further this syntactic undecidable object falls outside
recursively enumerable strategy sets.
23The first limitative result on functions computable by T.Ms is that at most there can only
be a countable number of these with the cardinality of N being denoted by N0, while from Cantor
we know that the set of all number theoretic functions have cardinality of 2N0 . Hence, not all
number theoretic functions are computable (see, Cutland [21]).
24Note, the terms computable functions and recursive functions will be used interchangeably.
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halt (denoted as φa(x) ↑). The domain of the function f(x) denoted by Dom φa or
Wa is such that,
Dom φa = Wa = {x |φa(x) ↓: TMa(x) halts} . (2)
Note, the range of computable functions f(x) ∼= φa(x) will be denoted as Ea.
Definition 3.1. Computable functions that are defined on the full domain of N are
called total computable functions. Partial computable functions are those functions
that are defined only on some subset of N . Related to (2) is the notion of sets
whose members can be enumerated by an algorithm or a TM.
Definition 3.2. A set which is the null set or the domain or the range of a re-
cursive/computable function is a recursively enumerable set. Sets that cannot be
enumerated by T.Ms are not recursive enumerable.
The one feature of computation theory that is crucial to game theory where
players have to simulate the decision procedure of other players, is the notion of the
Universal Turing Machine (UTM).
Definition 3.3. The UTM is a partial computable function, defined as ψ(a, x),
which uses the index a of the TM whose behaviour it has to simulate. By what
is called the Parametrization Theorem, there is a total computable function τ(a)
which determines the index or g.n of the UTM such that.
ψ(a, x) = φτ(a)(x) ∼= φa(x). (3)
Equation (3) says that the UTM with index τ(a), on the left-hand side of (3)
using input x will halt and output what the TMa on the right-hand side does when
the latter halts and otherwise both are undefined. In what follows, the Parametriza-
tion Theorem will be used for effective constructions of indexes/g.ns for sets and
functions, which in the case in (3), the total recursive numbering function τ oper-
ating on g.n of TMa yields τ(a) = e = g.nψ(a, x). The last equality states that the
terms in the first two yield the index/g.n for the UTM25.
Of particular significance are TMs that use their own code/g.n as inputs in their
calculation. We will refer to these as self-referential calculations. The following set
C and its complement, C˜, that respectively, characterize TMs that halt or do not
halt on their own codes play an important role in the proof of incompleteness and
undecidability of formal systems.
Definition 3.4. The set denoted by C is the set of g.ns of all TMs that halt when
operating on their own g.ns or alternatively C contains the g.ns of those recursively
enumerable sets that contain their own codes (see, Cutland [21, p.123], Rogers [61,
p.62]).
C = {x |φx(x) ↓;TMx(x) halts;x ∈Wx} , (4)
C˜ = {x |φx(x) ↑;TMx(x) does not halt;x /∈Wx} . (5)
Theorem 3.5. The set C˜ is not recursively enumerable.
25It is customary to denote the indexes/g.ns as single alphabets, typically {a, e, x, n, i . . . } or
as stand alone expressions such as, σn , while as in case of (3), the total computable encoding
function of the Parameterization Theorem that outputs the indexes/g.ns will be depicted as a
function of an input and denoted generically as τ(.).
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In the proof that C˜ is not recursively enumerable, viz there is no computable
function that will enumerate it, the Cantor diagonalization method is used26. Hence,
C is a recursively enumerable set that is not recursive, the latter would require both
C and C˜ to be recursively enumerable. This is not possible as C˜ is not recursively
enumerable by Theorem 3.5.
3.2. Post [58] set theoretic representation of Go¨del incompleteness. As
indicated in the introduction, we will now state the formal character of systems
capable of the endogenous production of novelty or surprises in terms of creative
and productive sets first defined by Emil Post [58].
Definition 3.6. A creative set Q is a recursively enumerable set whose compli-
ment, Q˜, is a productive set. The set Q˜ is productive if there exists a recursively
enumerable set Wx disjoint from Q (viz. Wx ⊂ Q˜) and there is a total computable
function f(x) which belongs to Q˜ −Wx. Thus, f(x) ∈ Q˜ −Wx is referred to as
the productive function and is a ‘witness’ to the fact that Q˜ is not recursively
enumerable. Any effective enumeration of Q˜ will fail to list f(x) even though by
construction f(x) ∈ Q˜−Wx (Cutland [21, p.134-136]).
Lemma 3.7. Set C in (4) is an example of a creative set. Consider Wi to be
a recursively enumerable set which is disjoint from C. The productive function
f(i) = i is the identity function for the productive set C˜, such that f(i) ∈ C˜−Wi.
Proof is straightforward. By the definition of C in (4) if any number i ∈ C ↔
i ∈ Wi . Hence, for f(i) = i, if f(i) ∈ C ↔ i ∈ Wi and Wi will not be disjoint
from C. As Wi is disjoint from C, viz. Wi ∩ C = ∅ and hence f(i) /∈ C ∪Wi.
Also, f(i) = i ∈ C˜−Wi . The Post productive function f(i) provides the evidence
that C˜ has syntactic objects which cannot be exhaustively enumerated by any TM.
In formal systems, as proof is identical to computation, we can model a simple
formal system given by the sets C and C˜. The set C gives all theorems of the form
φx(x) ↓ with theoremhood defined by the halting of TMs. The negations of provable
propositions in C, denoted by g.n x¬ cannot be theorems in the formal system on
pain of inconsistency. The refutable propositions (viz. propositions whose negations
are provable) can be enumerated one by one as theorems are proved in C and we
can collect them in a set Wq = {x¬|φ¬x (x¬) ↑ iff φx(x) ↓}. As the formal system is
consistent, clearly the two recursively enumerable sets C and Wq are disjoint and
C ∩Wq = ∅ and Wq ⊂ C˜. Also, Wq 6= C˜, for if Wq = C˜, then the formal system
is complete, but inconsistent. The Post productive function f(q) = q takes on the
status of the undecidable proposition as it lies outside both the recursively enumer-
able sets C of provable propositions and Wq of refutable propositions. Cutland [21,
p.148] calls this the Go¨del incompleteness result in miniature.
As underscored by Smullyan [65, p.58] and is widely known (see, Cutland [21,
Ch.3, Sec.3 and Ch.8]), the construction of two recursively inseparable disjoint
subsets involving creative and productive sets, such as that of C and Wq ⊂ C˜ with
26Assume that there is a computable function f = φy , whose domain Wy = C˜. If there is
such a computable function φy , then the membership of C˜ could be listed. Now, if y ∈Wy , then
y ∈ C˜ as we have assumed C˜ = Wy . But, by the definition of C˜ in (5) if y ∈Wy , then y ∈ C and
not to C˜. Alternatively, if y /∈ Wy it implies that y /∈ C˜, given the assumption that C˜ = Wy .
Then, again we have a contradiction, as since from (5) when y /∈ Wy , y ∈ C˜. Thus, we have to
reject the assumption that for some computable function f = φy , its domain Wy = C˜.
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Wq disjoint from any subset of C, plays a fundamental role in modern approaches
to incompleteness and undecidability. In what follows in our proof that the Nash
equilibrium surprise strategy functions are the Post productive functions, the g.ns
of which lie outside extant recursively enumerable strategy sets, we will utilize what
are called recursive reductions (Smullyan [65, Ch. V], Cutland [21, Ch.3, Ch.8]) of
the archetypical sets C and C˜.
The inseparability of two recursively enumerable disjoint number sets, B and
D(B ⊂ C and D ⊂ C˜), arises from the property that a recursive reduction of these
sets to two other sets, respectively, denoted as B′ and D′, will imply that the g.n
for the productive function for B˜′ lies outside of both B′ and D′ and will be a
constructive ‘witness’ for incompleteness. The following Lemma 3.8 will be used
to engineer a recursive reduction between sets such as B and D and the respective
sets B′ and D′ to prove that the Nash equilibrium surprise strategy is none other
than the productive function, as in the case for the set B˜′.
Lemma 3.8. Consider two recursively enumerable disjoint number sets, B and D
with B ⊂ C and D ⊂ C˜, where C and C˜ are respectively defined in (4) and (5),
and let D = Wσ¬n be the recursively enumerable subset of C˜ of Lemma 3.7 with
index σ¬n .
(i)As, g(σ¬n )= identity function is a productive function of C˜ with g.n(g(σ
¬
n )) =
σ¬n /∈ C ∪Wσ¬n , it also serves as the productive function for B˜.
Let the total recursive function h(i) define the following many-1 reduction of B to
B′: i ∈ B iff h(i) ∈ B′. Hence, by this assumption,
(ii) B = h−1B′ and
(iii) B˜ = h−1B˜′
Conditions (i)-(iii) implies that
(a) As B is creative so is B′ and as B˜ is productive, the recursive reduction function
h(i) implies that B˜′ is productive with a recursively enumerable subset D′ = Wσ!n
disjoint from B′.
(b) Also, h(g(σ¬n ))
27 is the productive function for B˜′ and with D′ = Wσ!n , the
g.n(h(g(σ¬n )) /∈ B′ ∪Wσ!n .
Proof. 28 Lemma 3.8(a): As B and D are disjoint and D ⊂ C˜ with g, the productive
function of Lemma 3.7 being an identity function, σ¬n cannot belong to either B or
D as this will imply that σ¬n ∈Wσ¬n . By Lemma 3.7, we have already proven that
σ¬n /∈ C and hence it cannot belong to B either. For, if σ¬n ∈ B , then as B ⊂ C,
σ¬n ∈Wσ¬n by definition of C in (4) and Wσ¬n ⊂ C, which entails a contradiction.
Hence, σ¬n /∈ B and σ¬n /∈ B ∪Wσ¬n . This also implies that B is creative and as B˜
is not recursively enumerable, B˜ is productive as stated in (i).
Lemma 3.8(b): The definition of recursive reduction function h(i) will guarantee
that as B˜ is productive, so is B˜′. Hence, suppose there is a recursively enumer-
able subset D′ = Wσ!n ⊂ B˜′. Use (iii) that D = h−1(Wσ!n) = Wσ¬n ⊂ B˜. For
every index σ!n of a recursively enumerable subset of Wσ!n of B˜
′ and for any re-
cursive function h−1, by the Parameterization Theorem there is a total recursive
numbering function τ(σ!n) = σ
¬
n . As g.n(g(σ
¬
n )) = σ
¬
n /∈ B ∪Wσ¬n from (i), the
27Note, h(g(σ¬n )) is the total recursive productive function, we denote its g.n as g.n(h(g(σ¬n ))).
See, footnote 24.
28This is analogous to the proof in Smullyan [65, p.96] Chapter V, Proposition 2 (a).
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recursive reduction function h maps the productive function for B˜ in such a way
that g.n(h(g(σ¬n )) /∈ B′ and also g.n(h(g(σ¬n ))) /∈Wσ!n . Hence, B˜′ is productive set
with productive function h(g(σ¬n )) and the g.n of this productive function is witness
for a syntactic object that is a novelty.
The non-trivial productive function h(g(σ¬n )) for B˜′ in Lemma 3.8, which is not
an identity function as in Lemma 3.7, will also be shown to arise from the surprise
best response function in the Nash equilibrium of the 2-person oppositional game.
4. 2-person game with Turing Machines and Go¨del meta-mathematics.
4.1. The 2-person game for Turing Machines. In order to model a game
conducted by TMs in which both cooperation and opposition can arise, such a
game, as discussed in the introduction, can be interpreted as a parasite-host or
regulatee-regulator game. The primitives of the game are codified as follows.
G = {(p, g), (Ap, Ag), s ∈ S} (6)
Here, (p, g) denote the respective g.ns of the objective functions, to be specified,
of players, p, the parasite/regulatee and g, host/regulator. The action sets denoted
by Ai are finite and countable with ail ∈ Ai, i ∈ (p, g) being the g.n of an action of
player i and l = 0, 1, 2, . . . , L. An element s ∈ S denotes a finite vector of states of
the world and other archival information and S is a finite and countable set. The
action set A = Ap∪Ag represents the known technologies. In order to highlight the
fundamental recursive nature of actions as technologies and the potential for new
technologies, the class of best response strategy functions will be defined as a set of
total computable functions.
Definition 4.1. The best response strategy functions fi, i ∈ (p, g) that are total
computable functions can belong to one of the following classes
fi =

f1i = 1 -(Unit Function) -Rule Abiding.
f¬i -Rule Breaking/Liar.
f !i -Surprise.
(7)
such that the g.ns of fi are contained in set
R = {m |fi = φm, φmis total computable} . (8)
The set R, which is the set of all total computable functions, is not recursively
enumerable. The proof of this is standard, see, Cutland [21, p.127].
As will be clear, (8) involves issues on how innovative actions/institutions can be
constructed from existing action sets. The remarkable nature of the set R is that
there are an uncountable infinite number of ways for new technologies to be formed.
The task is to show the conditions under which it is mutually deducible that the
best response function fi, i ∈ (p, g) satisfies Post’s productive function and is a
surprise strategy, fi = f
!
i = φm, such that m ∈ R−A. Only such innovations will
be accorded with the status of strategic innovations. The trigger for the surprise
strategy involves the identification of the negation or Liar strategy f¬i . These total
computable strategy functions with the exception of the unit function in (7) will be
shown to generate dynamics in the system.
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4.2. Go¨del meta-mathematics for interactive digital agents. This section
sets out how the Go¨del meta-mathematics helps to organize encoded information
involving self and other in the digital game. A major implication of imposing
computability constraints on all aspects of the game is that all meta-information
with regard to the outcomes of the game for any given set of states, s ∈ S, can
be effectively organized by the so called prediction function φσ(x,y)(s) in an infinite
matrix Ξ of the enumeration of all partial computable functions. This is given
below in Figure 1 (see, Cutland [21, p.208]). The tuple (x, y) identifies the row
and column of this matrix Ξ, the rows of which are denoted as Ξi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
Ξ0 φσ(0,0) φσ(0,1) φσ(0,2) φσ(0,3) . . . φσ(0,x) . . .
Ξ1 φσ(1,0) φσ(1,1) φσ(1,2) φσ(1,3) . . . φσ(1,x) . . .
Ξ2 φσ(2,0) φσ(2,1) φσ(2,2) φσ(2,3) . . . φσ(2,x) . . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
Ξx φσ(x,0) φσ(x,1) φσ(x,2) φσ(x,3) . . . φσ(x,x) . . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
... . . .
Figure 1. Prediction Function, Meta–Information on Outcomes
and Dynamics of 2-person Turing Machine Game.
The prediction function φσ(x,y)(s) if defined at a given state s and σ(x, y) yields
φσ(x,y)(s) = q. Here, q in some code, determines the outcome of the decision problem
of the game and q ∈ Eσx . Note, σ(x, y) is the index of the program for this function
φ that produces the output of the strategic decision problem of the 2-person game.
The tuple also identifies a point in the matrix Ξ in Figure 1. The conditions under
which the output of the prediction function for each (x, y) point in the above matrix
is defined is given in the following Theorem 4.2. As will be discussed, the points
(x, y) will refer to a single player’s perspective of self and the other.
Theorem 4.2. The Go¨del representational system is a 1 − 1 mapping between
meta information in matrix Ξ in Figure 1 and executable computations such that
the conditions under which the prediction function φσ(x,y)(s) which determines the
output of the game for each (x, y) point is defined are as follows:
φσ(x,y)(s) ∼= φφx(y)(s) = q, iff φx(y) ↓ . (9)
Here, the total computable function σ(x, y) modelled along the lines of the Go¨del
two place substitution function29 (see, Rogers [61, p.202-204]) has the feature that
it names or ‘signifies’ in the meta system Ξ the points in the game that correspond
to the different executed calculations on the right-hand-side of (9) as we substitute
different values for (x, y) for a given state s. The g.ns representing σ(x, y) can
always be obtained whether or not the partial recursive function φx(y) on the right-
hand side of (9) which executes the programs halts.
Proof. See Rogers [61].
29This approach economizes on formalism and enables us to highlight and exploit the Fixed
Point Theorems of recursive function theory to determine Nash equilibrium outcomes more readily
than has been the case in for instance in Anderlini [3] and Canning [16].
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By the necessary condition in (9) if the function φx(y) on the right-hand side
(RHS) executing the machine calculation is defined, we say the prediction function
φσ(x,y) in the meta system on the left-hand side (LHS) simulating the output of the
game is computable and the outcome q of the game at that point is predictable.
Likewise, the ‘only if’ condition in (9) implies that meta statements that are valid
on the predictability of the outcomes of the game at any (x, y) must give the correct
inference on whether program executions on the right-hand side terminate.
In view of the discovery of the mirror neuron system, as indicated in Section 2
and discussed further in Markose [43], the set up in (9) formalizes the relationship
between a mirror/meta system on the LHS of (9) which records all machine execu-
tions on the RHS of (9) permitting action prediction, viz q, of self and other. In
Figure 2, the RHS of (9) is shown to relate to the canonical neuronal system (pink
neuron, φx(y)) involving action execution by self and as observer of the other (us-
ing the machine execution). The LHS of (9), in Figure 2 is shown to relate to the
oﬄine simulations being conducted by the yellow mirror neuron. The synchrony
implied in (9) can integrate self and the other as actor and observer. Figure 2
provides the schema of how common hardwiring of recursive meta-analysis in con-
specifics as in the LHS of (9) with a 1 − 1 synchrony with own action execution
on the RHS of (9), will result in the same oﬄine simulation for both players when
handling the same encoded information σ(x, y) via the Go¨del two place substitution
function.
Definition 4.3. The two place notation of the meta-system σ(x, y) can be used to
define a second-order encoding of the following kind defined entirely from a single
agent’s perspective:
(a) When player p has to determine her own best response function, the first
place entry x in σ(x, y) refers to what the player p does (viz the g.n of best response
function fp) given player g plays a best response strategy that is consistent with
player p attributing player g with the belief that player p has used strategy y (second
place entry in σ(.)). Note this is the self-referential second order belief in Bhatt and
Carmerer [12] relating to player p’s choice of action.
(b) All Nash equilibria and other relevant fixed points of the game that satisfy
what has been referred to as consistent alignment of beliefs (CAB), Osborne and
Rubinstein [56] have to be elements, σ(x, x), along the diagonal array of this matrix
in Figure 1. These correspond to self-referential TMs φx(x). Indexes σ(x, y) which
are off diagonal entries in matrix Ξ violate the CAB condition and cannot be Nash
equilibria.
Note, σ(x, x) diagonal points in the meta system Ξ in Figure 1 assume perfect
mutual mirroring. Thus, GTP meta-analyses on the LHS of (9) are operations on
Go¨del numbers yielding simulated or virtual experience of the actual phenomena,
and in principle bypass the online executions which involve canonical or motor
activity. In other words, all permissible inferences are obtained in short hand by
simulation from encoded information. Likewise, on account of the ‘only if’ condition
in Theorem 4.2, many interesting aspects of the Nash equilibria of computable
games can be established only with reference to the meta analyses, and information
in the matrix Ξ with no explicit reference to physical executions of programs. An
important out-of-equilibrium belief state will be defined here, which represents off
diagonal terms in matrix Ξ.
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Figure 2. Mirror Neurons As Oﬄine Simulations for Mutual Pre-
dictions with Self and Other as Go¨del 2-Place Substitution Func-
tion for Meta-Analysis (Rogers [61, p.202-204])
Definition 4.4. Deceit and False Belief : Denoting by x¬ the negation of x
brought about by best response function, called the Liar strategy, f¬i , i ∈ (p, g)
defined in (7), we have σ(x¬, x) in the two place meta representation of the game
by say p. In Definition 4.3(a), this represents the case when player p records his
negation of the action with g.n x and attributes to player g the false belief that
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player p is playing x. This can also be viewed as p having to be deceitful in order
that g maintains his false belief about p30, 31.
It will be shown how total computable functions for the best response function
fi, i ∈ (p, g) in a 2-person game when applied to the diagonal array of the matrix Ξ
can dynamically move it to a specific row in matrix Ξ in Figure 1. The Nash equi-
librium of the game requires the application of the Fixed Point or Second Recursion
Theorem.
Theorem 4.5 (Fixed Point or Second Recursion Theorem (SRT) (Cutland [21,
p.200])). Let f be a total unary computable function, then there exists a number v,
called the fixed point of f(v), such that
φf(v) = φv. (10)
Note, f(v) 6= v as they are codes for different programs, but they identify the
same function φ and both sides of equation (10) will yield an identical output if the
programs f(v) and v represent TM calculations that halt, viz. φf(v) ↓ and φv ↓.
From a perspective of the dynamics implied by (10), the property that any com-
putable function f has a recursively identifiable fixed point follows from the fact
that this computable function f represents an encoded set of instructions when ap-
plied to the diagonal array of matrix Ξ in Figure 1 can be found to yield a g.n m
for the program for φm = f
od where d(x) denotes the g.n of the program for the
partial recursive functions φx(x) along diagonal array of matrix Ξ in Figure 1. Let
v be the code for d(m) where d(m) represents φm(m). The proof of (10) follows by
noting
φv = φd(m) = φ∅m(m) = φfod(m) = φf(v). (11)
Note in the fixed point for the TM game, we will use the equivalence d(m) =
σ(m,m) and hence d(m) is the fixed point of f(d(m)) in the proof of SRT above.
As the application of the total computable strategy function fi(fi 6= 1) in (7) to the
diagonal array of Ξ in Figure 1 represents a new code m, in the mth row of Ξ, the
m + 1th element φfiσ(m,m) will coincide with the m + 1th element in the diagonal
array of Ξ, yielding
φfiσ(m,m) = φσ(m,m), i ∈ (p, g). (12)
Note, these recursive transformations from row to row of Ξ in Figure 1 can be
viewed as digitally generated dynamics. Theorem 4.5 is used in the determination
of the fixed points for the total computable functions best response function fi,
i ∈ (p, g). When one player applies his best response fi, Nash equilibria require
that other player identifies the same prediction function for producing the output
of the game under conditions of consistent alignment of beliefs (that avoids false
beliefs given in Definition 4.4) as a fixed point of fi.
30Thagard [68] gives one of the earliest accounts of the role of second order meta analysis, es-
pecially regarding the cognitive processes involved in deception. Thagard is credited with the view
that these meta models with recursion required “very little extra representation (space/memory)
due to the necessary assumption that the opponent has (roughly) the same cognitive abilities as
oneself”, MacInnes [41].
31Gunnthorsdottir et. al. [30] have found evidence that high ‘Mach’ types who seem better
equipped to conceive of deceit are also likely to deliver Nash equilibrium outcomes in well-known
trust games.
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5. Nash equilibria: When does one surprise the opposition?
5.1. Total computable best response functions and optimal strategy func-
tions. The optimization algorithms entailed in achieving best responses in the game
arise from the objective functions of players.
Definition 5.1. The objective functions of Turing Machine players are computable
functions Πi, i ∈ (p, g) defined over the partial recursive payoff/outcome functions
specified in (13) and the strategy functions specified in (7):
arg max
bi∈Bi
Πi(φσ(bi,bi|j)(s)), i ∈ (p, g). (13)
The choice set Bi contains the g.ns of strategy functions. The Nash equilibrium
strategies (βEg , β
E
p ) with g.ns denoted by (b
E
p , b
E
g ) entail up to two subroutines or
iterations, to be specified below. In principle, the strategy functions (βg, βp) are
Universal Turing Machines that simulate optimal strategies of the players that sat-
isfy (13) and involve the total computable best response functions (fp, fg) which
incorporate elements from the respective action sets A = (Ap, Ag) and given 2nd
order self-referential beliefs of one another’s optimal strategy denoted in (13) as bi|j
(see, Definitions 4.3a and 4.3b). In the Nash equilibrium best response calculus,
the first subroutine denoted by g.n b1 uses the optimization calculus to determine a
player’s own optimal action. The problem is that actions can in general be imple-
mented by any total computable best response function, fi = φm, m ∈ R, i ∈ (p, g)
in (8).
In standard rational choice models of game theory, the optimization calculus
(with g.n z) in the choice of best response restricts choice to given actions sets.
Hence, starting from some point σ(x, x), the strategy functions map from a relevant
tuple that encodes meta information of the game into given action sets:
βi(fiσ(x, x), z, s,A)→ Ai and fi = φm,m ∈ A, i ∈ (p, g). (14)
Unless this is the case, as the set R is not recursively enumerable there is in
general no computable decision procedure that enables a player to determine the
other player’s best response function. However, in principle, a strategic decision
procedure (βg, βp) for choice of best response, fi = φm, m ∈ R, i ∈ (p, g), can map
into R − A, implying that an innovative action not previously present in extant
action sets is used,
βi(fiσ(x, x), z, s,A)→ R−A and fi = f !i = φm,m ∈ R−A, i ∈ (p, g). (15)
The question is, which fixed point σ(x, x), fully encodable in the meta-mathe-
matics, will trigger such Nash equilibrium surprise strategies, (βE!g , β
E!
p ), with g.ns
denoted by (bE!p , b
E!
g )?
It has been noted in passing by Anderlini and Sabourian [4, p.1351], based on
the work of Holland [36], that heterogeneity in forms does not arise primarily by
random mutation but by algorithmic recombinations that operate on extant ‘tech-
nologies’. However, a number of preconceptions from traditional game theory such
as the ‘givenness’ of actions sets prevent Anderlini and Sabourian [4] from positing
that players who as in (15), equipped with the wherewithal for algorithmic recom-
binations of existing actions, do indeed innovate from strategic and logical necessity
rather than by random mutation. Indeed, it is the very function of the Go¨del meta
framework to ensure that no move in the game made by rational and calculating
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players can entail an unpredictable/surprise response function from set R−A unless
players can mutually infer by strictly codifiable means from σ(x, x) that (15) is a log-
ical implication of the optimal strategy at the point in the game. In other words, the
necessity of an innovative/surprise strategy as a best response and that an algorith-
mic decision procedure is impossible at this point are fully codifiable propositions
in the meta-analysis of the game. While it will be shown which specific structure
of opposition logically and strategically necessitates surprise strategies in the Nash
equilibrium of the game, in keeping with the Emil Post set theoretic formulation
of novelty production in Lemmas 3.8 and 3.8, the disjoint recursively enumerable
strategy sets that correspond to the recursive reduction to the archetypical creative
and productive sets in (4) and (5) have also to be developed.
5.2. Fixed point/second recursion theorem: The base-point. The meta-
analysis in the determination of Nash equilibrium strategies (βEp , β
E
g ) with g.ns
(bEp , b
E
g ) will be undertaken here. Calculations start at such a so called base-point
which is the fixed point of fg which has to be arrived at by player p in (16)
φfgσ(ba,ba)(s) = φσ(ba,ba)(s) = q. (16)
Here, ba is the g.n of the strategy fg that selects the optimal action a from set
A in (14) when g is put in for the index i. In the two place notation in σ(ba, ba) in
(16), the first ba from the left is the code of the program from (14) as adopted by p
to simulate the optimal rule a for the host, g, and the second place ba denotes that
p believes that g believes and acts on the basis that p is rule abiding and has left
the host’s rule a unchanged. The fixed point for fg in (16) is computable and the
outcome of the host’s rule a is predictable and q is the host g’s desired outcome. It
is convenient to assume that for specific states of the world, s, so called base-point
rules are optimal for the host, g , if the parasite is ‘rule abiding’. By rule abiding
is meant that p will leave the system unchanged in terms of the row ba of matrix
Ξ in Figure 1 for the case of rule a. However, the predictable outcome q may
involve profitable ‘arbitrage’ opportunities for p in the form of the Liar strategy.
This furnishes the conditions under which a transparent/predictable rule will fail
to be a Nash equilibrium strategy.
5.3. The Liar/rule breaker strategy: The logic of opposition. For player p,
for the given (a, s) it may be optimal to apply the Liar strategy, f¬p σ(ba, ba), with
code b¬a . Formally, the Liar strategy has the following generic structure. For any
state s when the host’s rule a applies,
φf¬p σ(ba,ba)(s) = q
¬, q¬ /∈ Eσba ↔ φσ(ba,ba) = q, q ∈ Eσba . (17)
For all s when policy rule a does not apply,
f¬p = 0 : Do Nothing.
The Liar can successfully subvert with certainty (LHS of 17) if and only if (↔)
the rule a has predictable outcomes (RHS of (17)) and f¬p itself is total computable.
Thus, f¬p = φm, m ∈ Ap, must include a codified description of an action rule if
undertaken by the Liar can subvert the predictable outcomes of the host’s rule a.
Formally, if q is predicted on the RHS of (17) then the application of f¬p to σ(ba, ba)
is equivalent to the condition of deliberate deceit in Definition 4.4 and the g.n of
the Liar strategy is b¬a in the first place of σ(b
¬
a , ba), while the second place entry
shows that g harbours a false belief about p, that p is rule abiding with ba which is
optimal for g. This out-of-equilibrium σ(b¬a , ba) point in the game is off diagonal in
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terms of the matrix Ξ in Figure 1 and this will bring about an outcome q¬ /∈ Eσba
which belongs to a set disjoint from the set that contains the desired outcome for
player g from rule a for all s for which rule a applies, viz. Eσba ∩ Eσb¬a = ∅. The
outcomes (q¬, q) can be zero sum, but in general we refer to property q /∈ Eσba in
(17) as being oppositional or subversive.
As discussed, in a Nash equilibrium, p has to remove any attribution of false
belief to the other. Both players can identify the fixed point of f¬p using the Second
Recursion Theorem 4.5 to get σ(b¬a , b
¬
a ) on the RHS of (18) where b
¬
a is the code
for the Liar strategy in (17).
Theorem 5.2 (Go¨del sentence for the oppositional game as a fixed point result).
The prediction function φσ((b¬a ,b¬a ) indexed by the fixed point of the Liar/rule breaker
best response function f¬p in (18) is not computable and the following corresponds
to the famous Go¨del sentence for the game.
φf¬g σ(b¬a ,b¬a )(s) = φσ(b¬a ,b¬a )(s). (18)
Proof. The proof that the program representing the fixed point of f¬p will fail to
compute the outcome of the game in (18) proceeds as follows. Recall from the Sec-
ond Recursion Theorem 4.5 and (10), that the indexes σ(b¬a , b
¬
a ) and f
¬
p σ(b
¬
a , b
¬
a )
represents programs to compute the same prediction function φ32. However, by
construction as f¬p is the Liar Strategy in (17), this implies that if on the RHS
of (18) φσ(b¬a ,b¬a )(s) halts with the output q, the LHS of (18) produces output q
¬.
Hence, if (18) is computable, we have q = q¬, which is a contradiction of the Second
Recursion Theorem 4.5. Hence, the computation on both sides of (18) will not
halt and the outcome of the game is undecidable. The Go¨del sentence for the game
in (18) therefore represents a fully encoded statement of this.
Note the condition of the out-of-equilibrium success of the Liar spelt out in (17)
and the outcome of the game when player g, the host, is deceived is computable.
In many fast moving competitive co-evolutionary systems, while the full digital
molecular record of such adversarial encounters occurs33, overt phenotypes from
the ‘original’ predictable strategies such as ba or b
¬
a may not be observed. Instead
only the arms race in novelty given in the next section is what persists such that
both players co-exist.
32This can be verified from the proof of Second Recursion Theorem (SRT) 4.5. Starting
with d(x) = σ(ba, ba), denote φb¬a = f
¬
p ◦ d(ba) where b¬a is the g.n of the Liar Strategy defined
in (17). Following the proof of SRT, set v to be the g.n of d(b¬a ) = σ(b¬a , b¬a ) = φb¬a (b
¬
a ). Hence,
φv = φd(b¬a ) = φσ(b¬a ,b¬a ) = φφb¬a (b
¬
a )
= φf¬p od(b¬a )
= φf¬p σ(b¬a ,b¬a )
= φf¬p (v). Thus, as required by
SRT, σ(b¬a , b¬a ) and fpσ(b¬a , b¬a ) are programs for the same prediction function on the RHS and
LHS in (18).
33Indeed, remarkably, in the recent experimental studies of molecular co-evolution in arms race
between parasite and host as in Kashiwagi and Yomo [37], both the original codes in the respective
genomes of the host and parasite and the novel codes that evolved in the course of the arms race
could be observed. In Markose [43] it is suggested that using environments suitable for neuro-
physiological experiments of such a game with human subjects, it will be interesting to identify
the brain waves arising at the juncture at which both players mutually know that say, player p
can achieve his best payoffs from an out-of-equilibrium configuration wherein the other player g
has to kept in a state of false belief σ(b¬a , ba) given in Definition 4.4.
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6. Surprise Nash equilibria. There is no paradox in stating that as both players
can encode the non-computability of (18) they will be able to mutually deduce that
the only Nash equilibrium strategies for both players that is consistent with meta
information in the fixed point in (18), is one that involves strategies that elude
prediction. On substituting the fixed point σ(b¬a , b
¬
a ) in (18) for σ(x, x) in (15),
g’s Nash equilibrium strategy βEg with g.n b
E
g implemented by an appropriate total
computable function such as in (15) must satisfy :
βEg (fgσ(b
¬
a , b
¬
a ), s,A)→ R−A and fg = fE!g = φm,m ∈ R−A. (19)
That is, fE!g implements an innovation and b
E!
g is the g.n of the surprise strategy
function in (19). Hence σ(bE!g , b
E!
g ) is the fixed point of f
E!
g .
Likewise, for player p, fE!p implements an innovation in (20) and b
E!
p is the g.n of
the surprise strategy function and hence σ(bE!p , b
E!
p ) is the fixed point of f
E!
p . Thus,
βEp (fpσ(b
¬
a , b
¬
a ), s,A)→ R−A and fp = fE!p = φm,m ∈ R−A. (20)
The intuition here is that from the non-computable fixed point with the Liar in
(18), the total computable best response function implementing the Nash equilib-
rium surprise strategies can only map as above into the domains of the action and
strategy sets of the players that cannot be algorithmically enumerated in advance.
6.1. Recursively enumerable disjoint sets, productive functions, surprises
and arms race. Using Theorem 5.2, Definition 3.6 and Lemma 3.8, we will
now prove the incompleteness results for the strategy sets of the players arising from
the Liar/rule breaking strategy. Analysis will be done for p’s strategy set Bp as the
strategy functions βp and βg, respectively, can be shown to implement a recursive
reduction, as in Lemma 3.8, of the archetypal creative set C in (4).
Corresponding to those (agl, s) tuples, agl ∈ Ag of g’s base point optimal strategy,
viz. those that are optimal for g, if p is assumed to be rule abiding and it is also
the case that p’s best response fp is to be rule abiding viz. fp = 1, the g.ns of
these optimal strategies for p, b1p ∈ Bp result in computable fixed points. Here, in
the case when p is rule abiding, b1 indicates the subroutine 1, which is sufficient for
the determination of the Nash equilibrium strategy. This set denoted by β1p which
contains g.ns of all of g’s actions for which p is rule abiding can be generated by
recursive methodology. Thus,
β1p =
{
b1p|φφb1p (b1p)(s) ↓ for all (agl, s), agl ∈ Ag, fp = 1
}
. (21)
Using logic in (17), a set β¬p can be recursively generated so that it contains
the g.ns of p’s strategies for when it is optimal for p to use the Liar best response
function f¬p to those base point (agl, s) tuples, (agl ∈ Ag) of g’s action set. By
Theorem 5.2, this is a set of p’s strategies that result in non-computable fixed
points. Hence,
β¬p =
{
b1¬p |φφb1¬p (b1¬p )(s) ↑ for all (agl, s), agl ∈ Ag, fp = f
¬
p
}
. (22)
For the same (agl, s) tuple, agl ∈ Ag constituting g’s base point optimal strategy,
p’s optimal strategy b1p cannot belong to both β
1
p and β
¬
p . Thus, logical consistency
of the meta-analysis requires β1p ∩β¬p = ∅ and these are the recursively enumerable
disjoint sets as required by Lemma 3.8. It is convenient, as shown in the following
Lemma 6.1, to use indexes for the sets Wσn and Wσ¬n that respectively enumerate
β1p and β
¬
p . Here, n denotes the nth element of a sequence of elements in the
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respective sets. In set Wσ¬n , σ
¬
n refers to σ(b
¬
a , b
¬
a ) in (18), arguably the most recent
encoding of the Go¨del sentence denoting the fixed point of the adversarial attack
on the opponent’s code . The formalism behind the indexing of sets corresponding
to Wσ¬n is given in Theorem 6.2.
Lemma 6.1. The set Wσn which represents the enumerable set β
1
p given in (21)
corresponds to set B in Lemma 3.8 and hence Wσn ⊂ C and set Wσ¬n which
represents the enumerable β¬p in (22) corresponds to set D in Lemma 3.8 and is
the recursively enumerable disjoint set from Wσn with Wσ¬n ⊂ C˜. Hence,
a) σ¬n /∈Wσn ⊂ C.
b) σ¬n /∈Wσ¬n and σ¬n /∈Wσn ∪Wσ¬n . This implies that β˜1p (the complement set
of β1p) is productive corresponding to the set Wσ¬n and the productive function of
which is g(σ¬n ) = identity function.
Proof of Lemma 6.1(a). By the Parameterization Theorem, as β1p is recursively
enumerable, the index function τ(ba) = σn for some b
1
p = ba in (21) is such that :
ba ∈ β1p ↔ φσn(σn) ↓↔ σn ∈ C. (23)
Set C is the archetypical creative set in (4). By construction for some b¬a =
b1¬p , b
¬
a /∈ β1p from (21). The Parameterization Theorem yields τ(b¬a ) = σ¬n for
the recursively enumerable set Wσ¬n which is disjoint from Wσn and Wσ¬n ⊂ C˜.
Lemma 6.1(b) follows immediately as σ¬n /∈ C. Lemma 3.8(i) yields σ¬n /∈Wσn∪
Wσ¬n and the productive function g(σ
¬
n ) = identity function for the productive set
β˜1p.
The feature that the productive function g(σ¬n ) is an identity function at the fixed
point relating to the Go¨del sentence is interesting. This implies that the digital
agent passively enumerates, in set Wσ¬n , all codes in β
¬
p that suffer adversarial
attack corresponding to the self-referential mutual representations of hostility in
non-computable fixed point of Theorem 5.2. As will be shown in Figure 4, sets
like Wσ¬n which are subsets of productive sets have a specific arms race like structure
in their recursive enumeration.
Finally, as the set β¬p contains negations of known strategies b
1
p that imply the
negation of g’s objectives, denoted generically as q in (17), for p and g to achieve
their, respective, desired objectives of q¬ and q, in a Nash equilibrium, these can
only be done by implementing surprise strategies that map outside of action set A.
The second iteration or subroutine denoted as b2 implementing fpσ(b
¬
a , b
¬
a ) for the
Nash equilibrium surprise strategy fE!p in (21) is a consistent many-one recursive
reduction (analogous to h in Lemma 3.8) of the recursively enumerable subset
Wσ¬n of the productive set C˜ in Lemma 6.1. The productive set corresponding to
C˜ in the many one recursive reduction will be denoted as β˜p
+
.
Theorem 6.2. (a) By construction of the recursive reduction, as shown in Fig-
ure 3, using the second iteration of the Nash equilibrium strategy function b2 on the
set Wσ¬n ,Wσ¬n ∈ C˜ in Lemmas 6.1 and 3.8 the set Wσ!n which is a recursively
enumerable subset of β˜p
+
is generated and bEp ! = b
!
n = g.n(b
2(fp(σ
¬
n ))) is g.n of
the Nash equilibrium total computable best response surprise strategy function, fE!p ,
which implements an innovation as in (20). Hence, fE!p is the productive function
of the set β˜+p such that b
!
n /∈ Wσ!n and p’s Nash equilibrium strategy set Bp is in-
complete and non-trivially productive.
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C˜ #
(#) Productive Function is Iden-
tity Function g(σ¬n ) = σ
¬
n .
Wσ¬n fpσ(b
¬
a , b
¬
a )
β˜+p ##
Wσ!n
(##) bE!p = g.n(b
2(g(σ¬n ))): g.n
of Surprise Strategy Function
fE!p .
Figure 3. The Incompleteness of p’s Nash Equilibrium Strat-
egy Set Bp. Note that the arrow denotes the many-one re-
cursive reduction of Lemma 3.8 using the second subroutine
fpσ(b
¬
a , b
¬
a ) = b
2 for the surprise strategy function in (20) from
the recursively enumerable subset Wσ¬n of the archetypical pro-
ductive set C˜ in Lemma 6.1 to the Surprise Strategy set Wσ!n , of
Theorem 6.2 yielding the productive surprise strategy function
fE!p with g.n(b
2(g(σ¬n )))
(b) Once the surprise Nash equilibrium strategy has been implemented by p with g.n
b!n, the growth of the strategy set can be proven to take the following non-anticipating
form and is shown in Figure 434:
Wσ!n+1 = Wσ!n ∪
{
b!n = g.n(b
2(fp(σ
¬
n )))
}
. (24)
Proof of Theorem 6.2(a). Proof follows from condition (ii) in Lemma 3.8. We
use the preimage mapping provided by the recursive reduction function b2 imple-
menting the second subroutine of the surprise strategy function fE!p in (20) with
Wσ¬n = (b
2)−1(Wσ!n), implying that the index b
!
n = g.n(b
2(g(σ¬n )) is the g.n of
the productive Nash equilibrium surprise function fpσ(b
¬
a , b
¬
a ) as g(σ
¬
n ) = σ
¬
n is the
identity productive function for Wσ¬n from Lemma 3.8 and Lemma 6.1. The
Parameterization Theorem provides a total recursive indexing function τ(σ¬n , b
2)
such that τ(σ¬n , b
2) = σ!n.
Proof of Theorem 6.2(b). Proof requires showing that surprise strategy functions
have g.ns b!n that can only be added on to the extant set Wσ!n and cannot belong
to Wσ!n itself. As in Figure 4, let Wσ!n =
{
b!0, b
!
1, . . . , b
!
n−1
}
. Then to get (24), use
the Parameterization Theorem on indexes in Wσ!n ∪
{
b!n = g.n(b
2(fp(σ
¬
n )))
}
such
that τ(σn!, b
!
n) = σ
!
n+1. Thus,
Wσ!n+1 = Wσ!n ∪
{
b!n = g.n(b
2(fp(σ
¬
n )))
}
= Wτ(σn!,b!n). (25)
Hence, for any n, if b!n ∈ Wσ!n will imply that σ¬n ∈ Wσ¬n , which was shown
not to be possible in Lemma 6.1 as it will lead to a conclusion that the fixed
34Figure 4 corresponds closely with Figure 7c of Theorem 3.11 in Cutland [21, p.138].
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β˜+p
Wσ!n+1
g.n(fE!p ) = b
!
n
Wσ!n
b!0, b
!
1, . . . , b
!
n−1
Figure 4. Arms Race in Surprises/Innovations: Productive Func-
tion Growth of the Surprise Strategy Set (see equation (25))(NB
g.n: Go¨del number)
point σ(b¬a , b
¬
a ) entailed in the Go¨del sentence in (18) is the code of a self-referential
halting TM. Also then, σ¬n ∈Wσn implying for some b¬a = b1¬p , b¬a ∈ β1p which is a
contradiction from (21) and (22).
The significance of Theorem 6.2 is that the surprise strategy is fully definable
as a meta-proposition and is paradox free as the surprise strategy is indeed a pure
innovation in the strategy set Bp and outside of recursively enumerable disjoint
sets Wσn ∪Wσ!n that, respectively, include all g.ns of actions/phenotypes on which
both agents cooperated with and those that produced innovations in the past. It is
precisely the absence of logical inconsistency and strategic irrationality in the meta
proposition on the surprise strategy that sustains the consistent alignment of beliefs
condition of a Nash equilibrium with surprises.
Thus, as already observed, for human players utilizing ideal reasoning provided
by Go¨del meta-analysis, the set R of best response functions in (8) should provide
an inexhaustible source of surprise or innovative strategies. However, by the same
token, by Theorem 6.2, there is no algorithmic way by which the prediction func-
tion with the index σ(bE!p , b
E!
p ) at the surprise equilibrium can produce an output q
though both players can mutually identify that σ(bE!p , b
E!
p ) is the fixed point of the
surprise Nash equilibrium best response function fE!p . Indeed, σ(b
E!
p , b
E!
p ) says that
this is so self-referentially. In a nutshell ‘innovate or be destroyed’ describes this
Nash equilibrium in which neither party can unilaterally deviate without drastically
impairing their prospects. The Go¨del numbers b!0, b
!
1, b
!
3, . . . , b
!
n in Figure 4 with a
full digital encoding of it in (25) can be interpreted to be the g.ns of the ‘antibodies’
or junk DNA produced in the oppositional encounters. Indeed, the inverse image
recursive construction of the reduction function in condition (ii) of Lemma 3.8 as
implemented in Theorem 6.2 will identify the code that was under ‘attack’ which
triggered the novelty production at points like b!n. Following from part (ii) of The-
orem 6.2 and as seen in Figure 4, once players are locked into an oppositional
structure, the strategy set of each player will grow utilizing the formalism of an
arms race in novelty.
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7. Concluding remarks. The paper is original in proposing that the issue of
novelty production by digital agents should be viewed as the capacity to exit from
recursively enumerable sets using the Post [58] productive functions that generate
the Go¨del sentences or some non-trivial recursive reduction of it (see Lemmas 3.8
and 6.1) to yield constructive ‘witness’ of Go¨del incompleteness. A key objective
of this paper is to demonstrate that the Go¨del sentence far from being a ‘funky’
and esoteric mathematical construction of little relevance beyond the foundations of
mathematics, is an ubiquitous phenomena which can be seen to be the driving force
behind the complex protean phenotypes associated with genomic evolution and in
the form of novel artifacts or extended phenotypes in organisms and humans. The
capacity for syntactic encoding of a mutual state of hostility, negation or deceit,
viz. the embedding of the Go¨del sentence is what is logically necessary for novelty
producing behaviours in digital agents.
The deeply contextual points of exit from recursively enumerable sets, with inno-
vations following in lock step, have been demonstrated to occur in Theorem 6.2.
It has been claimed that the novel digital objects generated in the bootstrapped
growth of the recursively enumerable subset of the Post productive set, as featured
in (25), at the genomic level can be considered to be digital records of phenotypical
responses to counter hostile agents that is analogous to ‘junk DNA’ or antibodies.
The remarkable significance of the Go¨del incompleteness theorem is that to date
there is only one mathematical exit route from known listable sets in order for
digital agents to construct novel objects that fall outside of these sets. Without
the wherewithal to construct the syntactic object called the Go¨del sentence, digital
agents will be entrapped within given recursively enumerable repertoires with no
autonomy in bootstrapping complex and novel outcomes. The paper gives a full
elucidation of of the GTP logic behind the Wolfram-Chomsky Type 4 dynamics that
underpin the respective conjectures of McClintock [47] on the ‘dynamic genome’ and
the Ben-Jacob [11] on the ‘creative genome’.
Despite the seminal insights of Binmore [13], Type 4 dynamics with a Nash
equilibrium of novelty and surprises lies outside the ambit of extant game theory.
The game involving digital agents with GTP powers for encoding, self-reference, re-
cursion and incorporation of the oppositional structure qua the Liar has been shown
to lead to strategic innovations. The GTP meta-mathematics has thrown light on
the significance of the discoveries of the Parma Group of the mirror neuron system
and their hypothesis that the MNS provides embodied oﬄine simulations of online
action executions by self and of those based on the observations of others. Further,
the discovery by Kelso and co-authors (Tognoli et. al. [69], Naeem et. al. [53]) that
negation inherent to anti-coordination in social interaction is part of MNS, gives
evidence for the second of the logical conditions needed by the GTP logic for com-
plex protean behaviours. This calls for considerable future work covering GTP logic
in digital agents, their powers of recursion and the neuro-physiology of adversarial
agents to understand the nexus between social coordination, anti-coordination and
innovation.
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